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Abstract. Runtime monitoring is commonly used to detect the violation of desired properties in safety
critical systems by observing run prefixes of the system. Bauer et al. introduced an influential framework
for monitoring Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) properties, which is based on a three-valued semantics:
the formula is already satisfied by the given prefix, it is already violated, or it is still undetermined,
i.e., it can be satisfied and violated. However, a wide range of formulas are not monitorable under this
approach, meaning that every prefix is undetermined. In particular, Bauer et al. report that 44% of the
formulas they consider in their experiments fall into this category.
Recently, robust semantics for LTL were introduced to capture degrees of violation of universal prop-
erties. Here, we define robust semantics for run prefixes and show its potential in monitoring: every
formula considered by Bauer et al. is monitorable under our approach. Furthermore, we show that
properties expressed with the robust semantics can be monitored by deterministic automata.
Keywords: Runtime Monitoring · Linear Temporal Logic · Robustness
1 Introduction
Runtime monitoring is nowadays routinely used to assess the satisfaction of properties of systems during their
execution. It is especially useful for systems that cannot be verified prior to deployment and, for this reason,
can contain hidden bugs. While it is useful to catch and document these bugs during an execution of a system,
we find that the current approach to runtime verification based on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [14] is not
sufficiently informative, especially in what regards a system’s robustness. Imagine that we are monitoring a
property ϕ and that this property is violated during an execution. In addition to be alerted to the presence
of a bug, there are several other questions we would like to have answered such as: although ϕ was falsified,
was there a weaker version of ϕ that was still satisfied or did the system fail catastrophically? Similarly,
if we consider a property of the form ϕ → ψ, where ϕ is an environment assumption and ψ is a system
guarantee, and the environment violates ϕ slightly along an execution can we still guarantee that ψ is only
slightly violated?
Answering these questions requires a logical formalism for specifying properties that provides meaning
to terms such as weaker and slightly. Formalizing these notions within temporal logic, so as to be able
to reason about the robustness of a system, was the main impetus behind the definition of robust Linear-
time Temporal Logic (rLTL) [50]. While reasoning in LTL yields a binary result, rLTL adopts a five-valued
semantics representing different shades of violation. Consider, for example, the specification a → b
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requiring that b is always satisfied provided a is always satisfied. In LTL, if the premise a is violated in a
single position of the trace, then the specification is satisfied vacuously, eliminating all requirements on the
system regarding b. In this case, rLTL detects a mild violation of the premise and thus allows for a mild
violation of the conclusion.
The very same reasons that make runtime verification for LTL so useful also motivate the need for
developing the theoretical framework proposed in this paper for rLTL runtime verification. To this end,
we tackle the problem of evaluating a property over infinite traces based on a finite prefix similarly to
Bauer et al. [14]. If the available information is insufficient to declare a specification violated or satisfied, the
monitor reports a ?. This concept is applied to each degree of violation of the rLTL semantics. Thus, the rLTL
monitor’s verdict consists of four three-valued bits. Each bit represents a degree of violation/satisfaction of
the specification in increasing order of severity.
As an example, consider an autonomous drone that may or may not be in a stable state7. The specification
requires that it remains stable throughout the entire mission. However, if the take-off is shaky due to bad
weather, the drone is unstable for the first couple of minutes of the mission. An LTL monitor thus jumps
to the conclusion that the specification is violated whereas an rLTL monitor only reports a partial violation.
As soon as the drone stabilizes, the rLTL monitor refines its verdict by also reporting a partial satisfaction.
The main research contributions of this paper are thus a finite trace semantics for rLTL coupled with an
algorithm to synthesize monitors for rLTL specifications. The construction is doubly-exponential in the size
of the formula, so rLTL monitoring is no more costly than LTL monitoring.
We validate our approach by analyzing empirically whether an rLTL monitor provides more information
than an LTL monitor. As performance metric, we use Bauer et al.’s [13] definition of monitorability. An
LTL formula is monitorable if for any infinite trace there is a finite prefix by which the monitor can decide
whether or not the formula is violated or satisfied. We adapt this definition to rLTL and replicate Bauer et al.’s
experiments. We have found that 44% of their formulas are not LTL-monitorable whereas all of them are
rLTL-monitorable. This indicates that rLTL monitoring is an improvement over LTL monitoring in terms of
monitorability.
Proofs omitted due to space constraints can be found in the appendix.
Related Work In runtime verification [21,33,38,44] the specification is often given in LTL [42]. While prop-
erties arguing about the past or current state of a system are easily monitorable [32], LTL can also express
assumptions on the future that cannot be validated using only a finite prefix of a word. Thus, adaptations
of LTL have been proposed which include different notions of a next step on finite words [23,41], lifting LTL
to a three- or four-valued domain [13,14], or applying predictive measures to rule out impossible extensions
of words [51].
Moreover, tools for monitoring first-order temporal logics using BDDs [31], Regular Expressions [11], SMT
solvers [19] or rule-based systems [9,10] have been introduced. These, however, only yield binary results.
Non-binary monitoring has been addressed by adding quantitative measures such as counting events [8,43].
Moreover, monitoring tools collecting statistics [2,4,28] become increasingly popular: Snort [48] is a commer-
cial tool for rule-based network monitoring and computing efficient statistics, Beep Beep 3 [30] is a tool based
on a query language allowing for powerful aggregation functions and statistical measures. On the downside,
it imposes the overhead of running a heavy-weight application on the monitored system. In contrast, we
generate monitor automata out of an rLTL formula. Such an automaton can easily and automatically be
implemented on almost any system with statically determined memory requirements and negligible perfor-
mance overhead. Similarly, the Copilot [46] framework based on synchronous languages [16,17] transforms a
specification in a declarative data-flow language into a C implementation of a monitor with constant space
and time requirements. Lola [3,17] allows for more involved computations, also incorporating parametriza-
tion [26] and real-time capabilities [25] while retaining constant space and time requirements.
Rather than enriching temporal logics with quantitative measures [35], we consider a robust version of
LTL: rLTL [6,5,50]. Robust semantics yields information about to which degree a trace violates a property.
We adapt the semantics to work with finite traces by allowing for intermediate verdicts. Here, a certain
7 By this we mean, e.g., that the error in tracking a desired trajectory is below a certain threshold.
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degree of violation can be classified as “indefinite” and refined when more information becomes available to
the monitor. In a similar fashion, for Signal Temporal Logic [40,39], Donze et al. [20] introduced a notion of
robustness. Here, the output is real-valued which comes at a prize of significantly higher overhead at runtime.
The quality of the monitor’s output can be improved by distinguishing between input and output signals [27]
or taking the signal processing pipeline into account [1].
2 Robust Linear Temporal Logic
Throughout this work, we assume basic familiarity with classical LTL and refer the reader to a textbook
for more details on the logic (see, e.g., [7]). Moreover, let us fix some finite set P of atomic propositions
throughout the paper and define Σ = 2P . We denote the set of finite and infinite words over Σ by Σ∗
and Σω, respectively. The empty word is denoted by ε and ⊑ and ⊏ denote the non-strict and the strict
prefix relation, respectively. Moreover, we denote the set of Booleans by B = {0, 1}.
The logics LTL and rLTL share the same syntax save for a dot superimposed on temporal operators.
More precisely, the syntax of rLTL is given by the grammar
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ | ϕUϕ | ϕRϕ | ϕ | ϕ,
where p ranges over atomic propositions in P and the temporal operators , U, R, and correspond
to “next”, “until”, “release”, “eventually”, and “always”, respectively. 8 The size |ϕ| of a formula ϕ is the
number of its distinct subformulas. Furthermore, we denote the set of all LTL and rLTL formulas over P by
ΦLTL and ΦrLTL, respectively.
The development of rLTL was motivated by the observation that the difference between “minor” and
“major” violations of a formula cannot be adequately described in a two-valued semantics. If an LTL for-
mula ϕ, for example, demands that the property p holds at all positions of a word σ ∈ Σω, then σ violates ϕ
even if p does not hold at only a single position, a very minor violation. The semantics of LTL, however,
does not differentiate between the σ above and a σ′ in which the property p never holds, a major violation
of the property ϕ.
In order to alleviate this shortcoming, Tabuada and Neider introduced Robust Linear-time Temporal
Logic (rLTL) [50], whose semantics allows for distinguishing various “degrees” to which a word violates a
formula. More precisely, the semantics of rLTL are defined over the set B4 = {0000, 0001, 0011, 0111, 1111}
of five truth values, each of which is a monotonically increasing sequence of four bits. The truth values are
interpreted as follows: 0000 corresponds to false, 1111 to true, and the remaining truth values to different
“shades” of false, reflecting degrees of violation of a formula. To be able to refer to individual bits of an rLTL
truth value β ∈ B4, we use β[i] with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} as to denote the i-th bit of β.
For the sake of a simpler presentation, we denote the semantics of both LTL and rLTL not in terms of
satisfaction relations but by means of valuation functions. For LTL, the valuation function V : Σω×ΦLTL → B
assigns to each infinite word σ ∈ Σω and each LTL formula ϕ ∈ ΦLTL the value 1 if σ satisfies ϕ and the
value 0 if σ does not satisfy ϕ, and is defined as usual (see, e.g., [7]). The semantics of rLTL, on the other
hand, is more complex and formalized next.
Definition 1 ([5,6,50]). Let the function ltl : {1, . . . , 4}×ΦrLTL → ΦLTL be inductively defined as in Table 1.
The rLTL semantics is then given as the valuation function Vr : Σ
ω × ΦrLTL → B4, where for every σ ∈
Σω, every rLTL formula ϕ, and every i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, the i-th bit of Vr(σ, ϕ) is defined as Vr(σ, ϕ)[i] =
V
(
σ, ltl(i, ϕ)
)
(i.e., via the semantics of the LTL formulas ltl(i, ϕ)).
Intuitively, the four bits denote distinct levels of the violation of a property. For instance, for an rLTL
formula ϕ and a word σ ∈ Σω, the rLTL semantics ensures that (a) Vr(σ, ϕ)[1] = 1 if ϕ holds at all
positions of σ, (b) Vr(σ, ϕ)[2] = 1 if ϕ holds at almost all positions of σ, (c) Vr(σ, ϕ)[3] = 1 if ϕ holds
8 Note that we include the operators ∧, →, and R explicitly in the syntax as they cannot be derived from other
operators due to the many-valued nature of rLTL. Following the original work on rLTL [50], we also include the
operators and explicitly (which can be derived from U and R, respectively).
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Table 1. The function ltl : {1, . . . , 4} × ΦrLTL → ΦLTL.
Operator Symbol Semantics (where p ∈ P and ϕ,ψ ∈ ΦrLTL)
Atomic proposition p ∈ P 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, p) = p
Negation ¬ 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i,¬ϕ) := ¬ltl(1, ϕ)
Disjunction ∨ 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ ∨ ψ) := ltl(i, ϕ) ∨ ltl(i, ψ)
Conjunction ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ ∧ ψ) := ltl(i, ϕ) ∧ ltl(i, ψ)
Implication →
1 ≤ i ≤ 3: ltl(i, ϕ→ ψ) := (ltl(i, ϕ) → ltl(i, ψ)) ∧ ltl(i + 1, ϕ→ ψ);
ltl(4, ϕ→ ψ) := ltl(4, ϕ) → ltl(4, ψ)
Robust next 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ) := ltl(i, ϕ)
Robust eventually 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕ) := ltl(i, ϕ)
Robust always
ltl(1, ϕ) := ltl(1, ϕ); ltl(2, ϕ) := ltl(2, ϕ);
ltl(3, ϕ) := ltl(3, ϕ); ltl(4, ϕ) := ltl(4, ϕ)
Robust until U 1 ≤ i ≤ 4: ltl(i, ϕUψ) := ltl(i, ϕ) U ltl(i, ψ)
Robust release R
ltl(1, ϕRψ) := ltl(1, ϕ) R ltl(1, ψ);
ltl(2, ϕRψ) := ltl(2, ψ) ∨ ltl(2, ϕ);
ltl(3, ϕRψ) := ltl(3, ψ) ∨ ltl(3, ϕ);
ltl(4, ϕRψ) := ltl(4, ψ) ∨ ltl(4, ϕ)
at infinitely many positions of σ, and (d) Vr(σ, ϕ)[4] = 1 if ϕ holds at some position of σ. For a thorough
introduction and motivation, see the original work [50].
Finally, note that rLTL is an extension of LTL. In fact, the LTL semantics can be recovered from the
first bit of the rLTL semantics [50] (after every implication ϕ→ ψ has been replaced with ¬ϕ ∨ ψ).9
3 Monitoring Robust LTL
In their work on LTL monitoring, Bauer et al. [14] define the problem of runtime monitoring as “check[ing]
LTL properties given finite prefixes of infinite [words]”. More formally, given some prefix u ∈ Σ∗ and some
LTL formula ϕ, it asks whether all, some, or no infinite extension uσ ∈ Σω of u by some σ ∈ Σω satisfies ϕ.
To reflect these three possible results, the authors use the set B? = {0, ?, 1} to define a three-valued logic that
is syntactically identical to LTL, but equipped with a semantics in form of an evaluation function V m : Σ∗×
ΦLTL → B? over finite prefixes. This semantics is defined such that V m(u, ϕ) is equal to 0 (is equal to 1) if
no (if every) extension uσ of u satisfies ϕ. If neither is the case, i.e., if there is an extension of u that satisfies
ϕ and there is an extension of u that does not satisfy ϕ, then Vm(u, ϕ) is equal to ?.
We aim to extend the approach of Bauer et al. to rLTL, whose semantics is based on truth values from
the set B4 (containing the sequences of length four in 0
∗1∗). As a motivating example, let us consider the
formula ϕ = s for some atomic proposition s and study which situations can arise when monitoring this
formula. The semantics of ϕ is given by concatenating the truth values of the LTL formulas ltl(1, ϕ) = s,
ltl(2, ϕ) = s, ltl(3, ϕ) = s, and ltl(4, ϕ) = s.
First, consider the empty prefix and its two extensions ∅ω and {s}ω. We have Vr(∅ω, ϕ) = 0000 and
Vr({s}ω, ϕ) = 1111. Thus, all four bits can both be equal to 0 and 1. This situation will be captured by the
sequence ???? which signifies that for every position i and every bit b ∈ B, there exists an extension of ε that
has bit b in the i-th position of the truth value with respect to ϕ.
Now, consider the prefix {s} for which we have Vr({s}σ, ϕ)[4] = 1 for every σ ∈ Σω as ltl(4, ϕ) is satisfied
on each extension of {s} (s has already occurred). On the other hand, we have Vr({s}∅ω, ϕ) = 0001 and
9 It turns out that Tabuada and Neider’s original proof [50, Proposition 5] has a minor mistake. Although the
first bit of the rLTL semantics coincides with the original LTL semantics for all formulas that do not contain
implications, the formula ¬a → a is an example witnessing this claim is no longer correct in the presence of
implications. However, this issue can be fixed by replacing every implication ϕ→ ψ with ¬ϕ∨ψ. This substitution
results in an equivalent LTL formula for which the first bit of the rLTL semantics indeed coincides with the LTL
semantics.
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Vr({s}{s}ω, ϕ) = 1111, i.e., the first three bits can both be 0 and 1 by picking an appropriate extension.
Hence, the situation will be captured by the sequence ???1, signifying that the last bit is determined by the
prefix, but the first three are not. Using dual arguments, the sequence 0??? is used for the prefix ∅, signifying
that the first bit is determined by the prefix as every extension violates ltl(1, ϕ). However, the last three bits
are not yet determined by the prefix, hence the trailing ?’s.
Finally, consider the prefix {s}∅. Using the same arguments as for the previous two prefixes, we obtain
Vr({s}∅σ, ϕ)[1] = 0 and Vr({s}∅σ, ϕ)[4] = 1 for every σ ∈ Σω. Also, as before, we have Vr({s}∅∅ω, ϕ) = 0001
and Vr({s}∅{s}ω, ϕ) = 0111. Hence, here we obtain the sequence 0??1 signifying that the first and last bit
are determined by the prefix, but the middle two are not.
In general, we use truth values of the form 0∗?∗1∗, which follows from the fact that the truth values of
rLTL are in 0∗1∗. Hence, let B?4 denote the set of sequences of length four in 0
∗?∗1∗. Based on B?4, we now
formally define the rLTL monitoring semantics as a bitwise generalization of the LTL definition.
Definition 2. The robust monitoring semantics V mr : Σ
∗ × ΦrLTL → B?4 is defined as V
m
r (u, ϕ) = β with
β[i] =


0 if Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = 0 for all σ ∈ Σω;
1 if Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = 1 for all σ ∈ Σ
ω; and
? otherwise,
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, every rLTL formula ϕ, and every u ∈ Σ∗.
Using this semantics, we are able to infer information about the infinite run of a system after having read
only a finite prefix thereof. In fact, this robust semantics provides far more information about the degree of
violation of the specification than classical LTL monitoring as each bit of the monitoring output represents
a degree of violation of the specification: a ? turning into a 0 or 1 indicates a deterioration or improvement
in the system’s state, respectively. Consider, for instance, an autonomous drone with specification ϕ = s
where s denotes a state of stable flight (recall the motivating example on Page 4). Initially, the monitor would
output ???? due to a lack of information. If taking off under windy conditions, the state s is not reached
initially, hence the monitor issues a warning by producing V mr (∅
n, ϕ) = 0??? for every n > 0. Thus, the
safety condition is violated temporarily, but not irrecoverably. Hence, mitigation measures can be initiated.
Upon success, the monitoring output turns into V mr (∅
n{s}, ϕ) = 0??1 for every n > 0, signaling that flight
was stable for some time.
Before we continue, let us first state that the new semantics is well-defined, i.e., that the sequence β[1]β[2]β[3]β[4]
in Definition 2 is indeed in B?4.
Lemma 1. V mr (u, ϕ) ∈ B
?
4 for every rLTL formula ϕ and every u ∈ Σ
∗.
After having shown that every possible output of V mr is in B
?
4, the next obvious question is whether
V mr is surjective, i.e., whether every truth value β ∈ B
?
4 is realized by some prefix u ∈ Σ
∗ and some rLTL
formula ϕ in the sense that V mr (u, ϕ) = β. Recall the motivating example above: the formula s realizes
at least the following four truth values: ???? (on ε), ???1 (on {s}), 0??? (on ∅), and 0??1 (on {s}∅). It is
not hard to convince oneself that these are all truth values realized by s as they represent the following
four types of prefixes that can be distinguished: the prefix is empty (truth value ????), the prefix is in {s}+
(truth value ???1), the prefix is in ∅+ (truth value 0???), or the prefix contains both an {s} and an ∅ (truth
value 0??1).
For most other truth values, it is straightforward to come up with rLTL formulas and prefixes that realize
them. See Table 2 for an overview.
For others, such as 0011, it is much harder. Intuitively, to realize 0011, one needs to find an rLTL formula ϕ
and a prefix u ∈ Σ∗ such that the formula obtained by replacing all in ϕ by is not satisfied by any
extension of u, but the formula obtained by replacing all in ϕ by is satisfied by every extension of
u.10 Thus, intuitively, the prefix has to differentiate between a property holding almost always and holding
10 Note that this intuition breaks down in the presence of implications and negation, due to their non-standard
definitions.
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Table 2. Realizable truth values. For every truth value β, the next two columns show prefixes u and formulas ϕ such
that V m
r
(u, ϕ) = β, or that β is unrealizable.
Value Prefix Formula Value Prefix Formula
0000 ε a ∧ ¬a 0?11 ∅{a} a ∨ ¬a
000? ε a ∧ ¬ a 0111 ∅{a} aR a
0001 unrealizable ???? ε a
00?? ε a ∧ ¬a ???1 {a} a
00?1 ∅{a} a ∧ ¬a ??11 ε a ∨ ¬ a
0011 unrealizable ?111 ε a ∨ ¬ ¬ ¬a
0??? ∅ a 1111 ε a ∨ ¬a
0??1 ∅{a} a
infinitely often. It turns out that no such u and ϕ exist. A similar argument is true for 0001, leading to the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. All truth values except for 0011 and 0001 are realizable.
As shown in Table 2, all of the realizable truth values except for 0111 are realized by formulas using only
conjunction, disjunction, negation, eventually, and always. Further, 0111 can only be realized by a formula
with the release operator while the truth values 0011 and 0001 are indeed not realizable at all.
Note that the two unrealizable truth values 0011 and 0001 both contain a 0 that is directly followed by
a 1. The proof of unrealizability formalizes the intuition that such an “abrupt” transition from definitive
violation of a property to definitive satisfaction of the property cannot be witnessed by any finite prefix.
Finally, the only other truth value of this form, 0111, is only realizable by using a formula with the release
operator.
Going again back to the motivating example s, consider the evolution of the truth values on the
sequence ε, {s}, {s}∅: They are ????, ???1, and 0??1, i.e., 0’s and 1’s are stable when extending a prefix, only
a ? may be replaced by a 0 or a 1. This property holds in general. To formalize this, say that β′ ∈ B?4 is more
specific than β ∈ B?4, written as β  β
′, if, for all i, β[i] 6= ? implies β′[i] = β[i].
Lemma 2. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula and u, u′ ∈ Σ∗. If u ⊑ u′, then V mr (u, ϕ)  V
m
r (u
′, ϕ).
Lemma 2 immediately implies two properties of the semantics: impartiality and anticipation [18]. Impar-
tiality states that a definitive verdict will never be revoked: if V mr (u, ϕ)[i] 6= ?, then for all finite extensions
v ∈ Σ∗, the verdict will not change, so V mr (uv, ϕ)[i] = V
m
r (u, ϕ)[i]. Anticipation requires that a definitive
verdict is decided as soon as possible, i.e., if V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = ?, then u can still be extended to satisfy and to
violate ltl(i, ϕ). This holds by definition of V mr (u, ϕ).
Due to Lemma 2, for a fixed formula, the prefixes of every infinite word can assume at most five different
truth values, which are all of increasing specificity. It turns out that this upper bound is tight. To formalize
this claim, we denote the strict version of  by ≺, i.e., β ≺ β′ if and only if β  β′ and β 6= β′.
Lemma 3. There is an rLTL formula ϕ and prefixes u0 ⊏ u1 ⊏ u2 ⊏ u3 ⊏ u4 such that V
m
r (u0, ϕ) ≺
V mr (u1, ϕ) ≺ V
m
r (u2, ϕ) ≺ V
m
r (u3, ϕ) ≺ V
m
r (u4, ϕ).
Finally, let us consider the notion of monitorability [47], an important concept in the theory of runtime
monitoring. As a motivation, consider the LTL formula ψ = s and an arbitrary prefix u ∈ Σ∗. Then, the
extension u{s}ω satisfies ψ while the extension u∅ω does not satisfy ψ, i.e., satisfaction of ψ is independent
of any prefix u. Hence, we have V m(u, ψ) = ? for every prefix u, i.e., monitoring the formula ψ does not
generate any information.
6
In general, for a fixed LTL formula ϕ, a prefix u ∈ Σ∗ is called ugly if we have V m(uv, ϕ) = ? for every
finite v ∈ Σ∗, i.e., every finite extension of u yields an indefinite verdict. 11 Now, ϕ is LTL-monitorable
if there is no ugly prefix with respect to ϕ. A wide range of LTL formulas, e.g., ψ = s as above, are
unmonitorable in that sense. In particular, 44% of the LTL formulas considered in the experiments of Bauer
et al. are not LTL-monitorable.
We next generalize the notion of monitorability to rLTL. In particular, we answer whether there are
unmonitorable rLTL formulas. Then, in Section 5, we exhibit that all LTL formulas considered by Bauer
et al.’s experimental evaluation, even the unmonitorable ones, are monitorable under rLTL semantics. To
conclude the motivating example, note that the rLTL analogue s of the LTL formula ψ induces two
truth values from B?4 indicating whether s has been true at least once (truth value ???1) or not (truth
value ????). Even more so, every prefix inducing the truth value ???? can be extended to one inducing the
truth value ???1.
Definition 3. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula. A prefix u ∈ Σ∗ is called ugly if we have V m(uv, ϕ) = ???? for
every finite v ∈ Σ∗. Further, ϕ is rLTL-monitorable if it has no ugly prefix.
As argued above, the formula s has no ugly prefix, i.e., it is rLTL-monitorable. Thus, we have found
an unmonitorable LTL formula whose rLTL analogue (the formula obtained by adding dots to all temporal
operators) is monitorable. The converse statement is also true. There is a monitorable LTL formula whose
rLTL analogue is unmonitorable. To this end, consider the formula
( s ∧ ¬s)→ ( s ∧ ¬ s),
which is a tautology and therefore monitorable. On the other hand, we claim that ∅{s} is an ugly prefix
for the rLTL analogue ϕ obtained by adding dots to the temporal operators. To this end note that we
have Vr(∅{s}v∅ω, ϕ) = 1111 for every v ∈ Σ∗ and Vr(∅{s}v{s}ω, ϕ) = 0000 for every v ∈ Σ∗. Hence,
V mr (∅{s}v, ϕ) = ???? for every such v, i.e., ∅{s} is indeed ugly and ϕ therefore not rLTL-monitorable.
As a final example, consider the negation ¬ s of the above rLTL-monitorable formula. It is not hard
to see that we have V mr (u, ϕ) = ???? for every prefix u. Hence, ε is an ugly prefix for the formula, i.e., we
have found another unmonitorable rLTL formula. In particular, the example shows that, unlike for LTL,
rLTL-monitorability is not preserved under negation.
In the next section, we show our main result: The robust monitoring semantics V mr can be implemented
by finite-state machines.
4 Construction of rLTL Monitors
An rLTL monitor is an implementation of the robust monitoring semantics V mr in form of a finite-state
machine with output. More precisely, an rLTL monitor for an rLTL formula ϕ is a finite state-machineMϕ
that on reading an input u ∈ Σ∗ outputs V mr (u, ϕ). In this section, we show how to construct rLTL monitors
and that this construction is asymptotically not more expensive than the construction of LTL monitors. Let
us fix an rLTL formula ϕ for the remainder of this section.
Our construction of rLTL monitors is inspired by Bauer et al. [14] and generates a sequence of finite-
state machines (i.e., Büchi automata over infinite words, (non)deterministic automata over finite words,
and Moore machines). Underlying these machines are transition structures T = (Q, qI , ∆) consisting of a
nonempty, finite set Q of states, an initial state qI ∈ Q, and a transition relation ∆ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q. An
(infinite) run of T on a word σ = a0a1a2 · · · ∈ Σω is a sequence ρ = q0q1 · · · of states such that q0 = qI and
(qj , aj, qj+1) ∈ ∆ for j ∈ N. Finite runs on finite words are defined analogously. The transition structure T
is deterministic if (a) (q, a, q′) ∈ ∆ and (q, a, q′′) ∈ ∆ imply q′ = q′′ and (b) for each q ∈ Q and a ∈ Σ there
exists a (q, a, q′) ∈ ∆. We then replace the transition relation ∆ by a function δ : Q × Σ → Q. Finally, we
define the size of a transition structure T as |T | = |Q| in order to measure its complexity.
Our construction then proceeds in three steps:
11 Ugly prefixes [14] complement the good and bad prefixes of Kuperman and Vardi [37].
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1. We bring ϕ into an operational form by constructing Büchi automata Aϕβ for each truth value β ∈ B4
that can decide the valuation Vr(σ, ϕ) of infinite words σ ∈ Σω.
2. Based on these Büchi automata, we then construct nondeterministic automata Bϕβ that can decide
whether a finite word u ∈ Σ∗ can still be extended to an infinite word uσ ∈ Σω with Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β.
3. We determinize the nondeterministic automata obtained in Step 2 and combine them into a single Moore
machine that computes V mr (u, ϕ).
Let us now describe each of these steps in detail.
Step 1: We first translate the rLTL formula ϕ into several Büchi automata using a construction by Tabuada
and Neider [50], summarized in Theorem 2 below. A Büchi automaton is a four-tuple A = (Q, qI , ∆, F ) where
T = (Q, qI , ∆) is a transition structure and F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states. A run pi of A on σ ∈ Σω is a
run of T on σ, and we say that pi is accepting if it contains infinitely many states from F . The automaton A
accepts a word σ if there exists an accepting run of A on σ. The language L(A) is the set of all words
accepted by A, and the size of A is defined as |A| = |T |.
Theorem 2 (Tabuada and Neider [50]). Given a truth value β ∈ B4, one can construct a Büchi automa-
ton Aϕβ with 2
O(|ϕ|) states such that L(Aϕβ ) = {σ ∈ Σ
ω | Vr(σ, ϕ) = β}. This construction can be performed
in 2O(|ϕ|) time.
The Büchi automata Aϕβ for β ∈ B4 serve as building blocks for the next steps.
Step 2: For each Büchi automaton Aϕβ obtained in the previous step, we now construct a nondeterministic
automaton Bϕβ over finite words. This automaton determines whether a finite word u ∈ Σ
∗ can be continued
to an infinite word uσ ∈ L(Aϕβ ) (i.e., Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β) and is used later to construct the rLTL monitor.
Formally, a nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) is a four-tupleA = (Q, qI , ∆, F ) that is syntactically
identical to a Büchi automaton. The size of A as well is is defined analogously to Büchi automata. In
contrast to Büchi automata, however, NFAs only admit finite runs on finite words, i.e., a run of A on
u = a0 · · · an−1 ∈ Σ∗ is a sequence q0 · · · qn such that q0 = qI and (qj , aj, qj+1) ∈ ∆ for every j < n. A
run q0 · · · qn is called accepting if qn ∈ F . Accepted words as well as the language of A are again defined
analogously to the Büchi case. If (Q, qI , ∆) is deterministic, A is a deterministic finite automaton (DFA). It
is well-known that for each NFA A one can construct a DFA A′ with L(A) = L(A′) and |A′| ∈ O(2|A|).
Given the Büchi automatonAϕβ = (Qβ, qI,β , ∆β , Fβ), we first compute the set F
⋆
β = {q ∈ Qβ | L(A
ϕ
β (q)) 6=
∅}, where Aϕβ (q) denotes the Büchi automaton A
ϕ
β but with initial state q instead of qI . Intuitively, the set
F ⋆β contains all states q ∈ Qβ from which there exists an accepting run in A
ϕ
β and, hence, indicates whether
a finite word u ∈ Σ∗ reaching a state of F ⋆β can be extended to an infinite word uσ
′ ∈ L(Aϕβ ). The set F
⋆
β
can be computed, for instance, using a nested depth-first search [49] for each state q ∈ Qβ. Since each such
search requires time quadratic in |Aϕβ |, the set F
⋆
β can be computed in time O(|A
ϕ
β (q)|
3).
Using F ⋆β , we define the NFA B
ϕ
β = (Qβ, qI,β , ∆β , F
⋆
β ) that shares the transition structure of A
ϕ
β and uses
F ⋆β as the set of final states. The next lemma states that B
ϕ
β indeed recognizes prefixes of words in L(A
ϕ
β ).
Lemma 4. Let β ∈ B4 and u ∈ Σ∗. Then, u ∈ L(B
ϕ
β ) if and only if there exists an infinite word σ ∈ Σ
ω
with Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β.
Before we continue to the last step in our construction, let us briefly comment on the complexity of
computing the NFAs Bϕβ . Since B
ϕ
β and A
ϕ
β share the same underlying transition system, we immediately
obtain |Bϕβ | ∈ 2
O(|ϕ|). Moreover, the construction of Bϕβ is dominated by the computation of the set F
⋆
β and,
hence, can be done in time 2O(|ϕ|).
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Step 3: In the final step, we construct a Moore machine implementing an rLTL monitor for ϕ. Formally, a
Moore machine is a five-tuple M = (Q, qI , δ, Γ, λ) consisting of a deterministic transition system (Q, qI , δ),
an output alphabet Γ , and an output function λ : Q → Γ . The size of M as well of runs of M are defined
as for DFAs. In contrast to a DFA, however, a Moore machine M computes a function λM : Σ∗ → Γ that
is defined by λM(u) = λ(qn) where qn is the last state reached on the unique finite run q0 · · · qn ofM on its
input u ∈ Σ∗.
The first step in the construction of the Moore machine is to determinize the NFAs Bϕβ , obtaining
equivalent DFAs Cϕβ = (Q
′
β , q
′
I,β, δ
′
β , F
′
β) of at most exponential size in |B
ϕ
β |. Subsequently, we combine these
DFAs into a single Moore machine Mϕ implementing the desired rLTL monitor. Intuitively, this Moore
machine is the product of the DFAs Cϕβ for each β ∈ B4 and tracks the run of each individual DFA on the
given input. Formally, Mϕ is defined as follows.
Definition 4. Let B4 = {β1, β2, β3, β4, β5}. We define Mϕ = (Q, qI , Γ, δ, λ) by
– Q = Q′β1 ×Q
′
β2
×Q′β3 ×Q
′
β4
×Q′β5 ;
– qI = (q
′
I,β1
, q′I,β2 , q
′
I,β3
, q′I,β4 , q
′
I,β5
);
– δ
(
(q1, q2, q3, q4, q5), a
)
= (q′1, q
′
2, q
′
3, q
′
4, q
′
5) where q
′
j = δ
′
βj
(qj , a) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , 5};
– Γ = B?4; and
– λ
(
(q1, q2, q3, q4, q5)
)
= ξ
({
βj ∈ B4 | qj ∈ F
′
βj
, j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
})
,
where the surjective function ξ : 2B4 → B?4 translates sets B ⊆ B4 of truth values to the robust monitoring
semantics as follows: ξ(B) = β? ∈ B?4 with
β?[j] =


0 if β[j] = 0 for each β ∈ B;
1 if β[j] = 1 for each β ∈ B; and
? otherwise.
The main result of this paper now shows that the Moore machine Mϕ implements V
m
r , i.e., we have
λMϕ(u) = V
m
r (u, ϕ) for every prefix u.
Theorem 3. For every rLTL formula ϕ, one can construct an rLTL monitor of size 22
O(|ϕ|)
.
In a final post-processing step, we minimizeMϕ (e.g., using one of the standard algorithms for determin-
istic automata). As a result, we obtain the unique minimal monitor for the given rLTL formula.
It is left to determine the complexity of our rLTL monitor construction. Since each DFA Cϕβ is in the worst
case exponential in the size of the NFA Bϕβ , we immediately obtain that C
ϕ
β is at most of size 2
2O(|ϕ|) . Thus, the
Moore machineMϕ is at most of size 22
O(|ϕ|)
as well and can be effectively computed in doubly-exponential
time in |ϕ|. Note that this matches the complexity bound of Bauer et al.’s approach for LTL runtime
monitoring [14]. Moreover, this bound is tight since rLTL subsumes LTL and a doubly-exponential bound
is tight for LTL [37,14]. Hence, robust runtime monitoring asymptotically incurs no extra cost compared to
classical LTL runtime monitoring. However, it provides more useful information as we demonstrate next in
our experimental evaluation.
5 Experimental Evaluation
Besides incorporating a notion of robustness into classical LTL monitoring, our rLTL monitoring approach
also promises to provide richer information than its LTL counterpart. In this section, we evaluate empiri-
cally whether this promise is actually fulfilled. More precisely, we answer the following two questions on a
comprehensive suite of benchmarks:
1. How does rLTL monitoring compare to classical LTL monitoring in terms of monitorability?
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2. For formulas that are both LTL-monitorable and rLTL-monitorable, how do both approaches compare
in terms of the size of the resulting monitors and the time required to construct them?
To answer these research questions, we have implemented a prototype, which we named rLTL-mon. Our
prototype is written in Java and builds on top of two libraries: Owl [36], a library for LTL and automata over
infinite words, as well as AutomataLib (part of LearnLib [34]), a library for automata over finite words and
Moore machines. For technical reasons (partly due to limitations of the Owl library and partly to simplify the
implementation), rLTL-mon uses a monitor construction that is slightly different from the one described in
Section 4: instead of translating an rLTL formula into nondeterministic Büchi automata, rLTL-mon constructs
deterministic parity automata. These parity automata are then directly converted into DFAs, thus skirting
the need for a detour over NFAs and a subsequent determinization step. Note, however, that this alternative
construction produces the same rLTL monitors than the one described in Section 4. Moreover, it has the same
asymptotic complexity. The sources of our prototype are available online under an open-source license.12
Benchmarks and Experimental Setup Starting point of our evaluation was the original benchmark
suite of Bauer et al. [14], which is based on a survey by Dwyer on frequently used software specification
patterns [22]. This benchmark suite consists of 97 LTL formulas and covers a wide range of patterns, including
safety, scoping, precedence, and response patterns. For our rLTL monitor construction, we interpreted each
LTL formula in the benchmark suite as an rLTL formula (by treating every operator as a robust operator).
We have compared rLTL-mon to Bauer et al.’s implementation of their LTL monitoring approach, which
the authors named LTL3 tools. This tool uses LTL2BA [29] to translate LTL formulas into Büchi automata
and AT&T’s fsmlib as a means to manipulate finite-state machines. Since LTL2BA’s and Owl’s input format
for LTL formulas do not match exactly, we have translated all benchmarks into a suitable format using a
python script.
We conducted all experiments on an Intel Core i5-6600 @ 3.3GHz inside a virtual machine with 4GB
of RAM running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. As no monitor construction took longer than 600 s, we did not impose
any time limit.
Results Our evaluation shows that both LTL3 tools and rLTL-mon are able to generate monitors for all
97 formulas in Bauer et al.’s benchmark suite. Aggregated statistics of this evaluation are visualized in
Figure 1.13
The histogram in Figure 1a shows the aggregate number of LTL and rLTL monitors with respect to
their number of states. As Bauer et al. already noted in their original work, the resulting LTL monitors
are quite small (none had more than six states), which they attribute to Dwyer et al.’s specific selection of
formulas [22]. A similar observation is also true for the rLTL monitors: none had more than eight states.
In order to determine which formulas are monitorable and which are not, we used a different, though
equivalent definition, which is easy to check on the monitor itself: an LTL formula (rLTL formula) is moni-
torable if and only if the unique minimized LTL monitor (rLTL monitor) does not contain a sink-state with
universal self-loop that outputs “?” (that outputs “????”). Bauer et al. report that 44.3% of all LTL monitors
(43 out of 97) have this property (in fact, exactly the 43 LTL monitors with a single state), which means
that 44.3% of all formulas in their benchmark suite are not LTL-monitorable. By contrast, all these formulas
are rLTL-monitorable. Moreover, in 78.4% of the cases (76 out of 97), the rLTL monitor has more distinct
outputs than the LTL monitor, indicating that the rLTL monitor provides more fine-grained information
of the property being monitored; in the remaining 21.6%, both monitors have the same number of distinct
outputs. These results answer our first research question strongly in favor of rLTL monitoring: rLTL moni-
toring did in fact provide more information than its classical LTL counterpart. In particular, only 55.7% of
the benchmarks are LTL-monitorable, whereas 100% are rLTL-monitorable.
Let us now turn to our second research question and compare both monitoring approaches on the 54 for-
mulas that are both LTL-monitorable and rLTL-monitorable. For these formulas, Figure 1b further provides
statistical analysis of the generated monitors in terms of their size (left diagram) as well as the time required
12 http://bit.ly/rltl-sources
13 Detailed results can be found online at http://bit.ly/rltl-monitoring-evaluation.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of rLTL-mon and LTL3 tools on Bauer et al.’s benchmarks [14]
to generate them (right diagram). Each box in the diagrams shows the lower and upper quartile (left and
right border of the box, respectively), the median (line within the box), and minimum and maximum (left
and right whisker, respectively).
Let us first consider the size of the monitors (left diagram of Figure 1b). The majority of LTL monitors
(52) has between two and four states, while the majority of rLTL monitors (45) has between two and five
states. For 21 benchmarks, the LTL and rLTL monitors are of equal size, while the rLTL monitor is larger
for the remaining 33 benchmarks (in no case is the LTL monitor larger than the rLTL monitor). On average,
rLTL monitors are about 1.5 times larger than the corresponding LTL monitors.
Let us now discuss the time taken to construct the monitors. As the diagram on the right-hand-side of
Figure 1b shows, LTL3 tools was considerably faster than rLTL-mon on a majority of benchmarks (around
0.1 s and 2.6 s per benchmark, respectively). For all 54 benchmarks, the rLTL monitor construction took
longer than the construction of the corresponding LTL monitor (although there are two non-LTL-monitorable
formulas for which the construction of the rLTL monitor was faster). However, we attribute this large runtime
gap partly to the overhead caused by repeatedly starting the Java virtual machine, which is not required in
the case of LTL3 tools. Note that this is not a concern in practice as a monitor is only constructed once
before it is deployed.
Finally, our analysis answers our second question: rLTL monitors are only slightly larger than the corre-
sponding LTL monitors and although they require considerably more time to construct, the overall construc-
tion time was negligible for almost all benchmarks.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a monitoring framework for rLTL [50]. While LTL only reports if a property is
violated or satisfied, rLTL measures the degree of violation thereby granting more insight into a system.
The semantics of rLTL are based on infinite words. In runtime monitoring, however, only a finite prefix of
a system’s run is available. As a result of the lack of information about the future, a full verdict is not
necessarily possible. We thus adapted the semantics of rLTL to account for such prefixes by providing an
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output of four three-valued bits where a ? indicates a lack of information, similar to Bauer et al. [14]. The
finite rLTL semantics can be realized as a finite state machine. The construction process is asymptotically
no more expensive than the respective construction of an LTL monitor whereas the rLTL monitor always
provides as least as much information as the LTL monitor.
In addition to this theoretical validation, we replicated Bauer et al.’s benchmark consisting of 97 LTL
formulas compiled by Dwyer et al. [22] for an empirical analysis. With this, we are able to confirm our
hypothesis that the rLTL monitor is strictly more informative than its LTL counterpart in 77% of their
formulas. Moreover, Pnueli and Zaks [47] define that a formula is monitorable if the monitor will eventually
reach a definitive verdict for any prefix. However, 44% of the formulas in their benchmark are unmonitorable.
We transferred the definition to rLTL and observed that all of these formulas are rLTL-monitorable.
All in all, we can answer both research questions positively: monitoring a robust logic such as rLTL does
provide more information than an LTL monitor and the construction process is still practical as evidenced
by the same asymptotic complexity and comparable running time on Bauer et al.’s collection of formulas.
Bauer et al. [12] also introduced a four-valued semantics for LTL consisting of the usual satisfaction and
violation, as well as ⊤p and ⊥p. An output of ⊥p (⊤p) indicates that if the run were to end in the current
state, the formula would be violated (satisfied). Since this semantics also works on prefixes, an extension
incorporating the four-valued semantics on a bit-by-bit basis suggests itself.
Moreover, desired properties for cyber-physical systems often include real-time components such as “touch
the ground at most 15 seconds after receiving a landing command”. Monitors for logics taking real-time into
account [15] such as STL [39,40] induce high computational overhead at runtime when compared to LTL and
rLTL monitors. Thus, a real-time extension for rLTL retaining its low runtime cost would greatly increase
its viability as specification language.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs Omitted from Section 3
In this first part of the appendix, we present the proofs omitted in Section 3 on basic properties of the robust
monitoring semantics.
An Alternative Definition of Robust Semantics for LTL We begin by introducing an alternative
definition of the semantics of rLTL, which is more convenient to prove the results from Section 3. In fact, what
follows is the original definition of the rLTL semantics and proceeds to define the evaluation function Vr by
induction over the structure of formulas [50]. The definition we present in the main part has been introduced
in later works of the original authors [6,5].
We need to begin by introducing some notation. For σ = σ(0)σ(1)σ(2) · · · ∈ Σω and a natural number n,
define σ[n,∞) = σ(n)σ(n + 1)σ(n+ 2) · · · , i.e., as the suffix of σ obtained by removing the first n letters of
σ. Furthermore, we order the truth values in B4 by 0000 < 0001 < 0011 < 0111 < 1111.
Following Tabuada and Neider’s original work introducing rLTL its semantics can also be written as
follows:
– Vr(σ, p) =
{
1111 if p ∈ σ(0),
0000 if p /∈ σ(0),
– Vr(σ,¬ϕ) =
{
1111 if Vr(σ, ϕ) 6= 1111,
0000 if Vr(σ, ϕ) = 1111,
– Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = min{Vr(σ, ϕ1), Vr(σ, ϕ2)},
– Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = max{Vr(σ, ϕ1), Vr(σ, ϕ2)},
– Vr(σ, ϕ1 → ϕ2) =
{
1111 if Vr(σ, ϕ1) ≤ Vr(σ, ϕ2),
Vr(σ, ϕ2) if Vr(σ, ϕ1) > Vr(σ, ϕ2),
– Vr(σ, ϕ) = Vr(σ[1,∞), ϕ),
– Vr(σ, ϕ) = β with β[i] = maxn≥0 Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[i], i ∈ {1, . . . , 4},
– Vr(σ, ϕ) = β with
• β[1] = minn≥0 Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[1],
• β[2] = maxm≥0 minn≥m Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[2],
• β[3] = minm≥0 maxn≥m Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[3],
• β[4] = maxn≥0 Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ)[4],
– Vr(σ, ϕ1 Uϕ2) = β with
β[i] = max
n≥0
min{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[i], min
0≤n′<n
Vr(σ[n
′,∞), ϕ1)[i]}, i ∈ {1, . . . , 4},
– Vr(σ, ϕ1 Rϕ2) = β with
• β[1] = minn≥0 max{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[1],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[1]},
• β[2] = maxm≥0 minn≥mmax{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[2],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[2]},
• β[3] = minm≥0 maxn≥mmax{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[3],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}, and
• β[4] = maxn≥0 max{Vr(σ[n,∞), ϕ2)[4],max0≤n′<n Vr(σ[n′,∞), ϕ1)[4]}.
To reduce the number of cases we have to consider in our inductive proofs, we note that the robust
eventually and the robust always operator are syntactic sugar. Formally, we say that two rLTL formulas ϕ1, ϕ2
are equivalent, if Vr(σ, ϕ1) = Vr(σ, ϕ2) for every σ ∈ Σω. Now, let ⊤ = p ∨ ¬p and ⊥ = p ∧ ¬p for some
atomic proposition p. Then, the robust eventually and the robust always are, as usual, expressible in terms
of the robust until and the robust release, respectively.
Remark 1 (Tabuada and Neider [50]).
1. ϕ and ⊤Uϕ are equivalent.
15
2. ϕ and ⊥Rϕ are equivalent.
Finally, recall that the definition of the semantics presented in the main part is induced by the function ltl
translating a position i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and an rLTL formula into an LTL formula such that
Vr(σ, ϕ) = V (σ, ltl(1, ϕ))V (σ, ltl(2, ϕ))V (σ, ltl(3, ϕ))V (σ, ltl(4, ϕ)).
Thus, to determine the truth value of an rLTL formula ϕ on σ, it suffices to determine the truth value of
the LTL formulas ltl(i, ϕ) on σ. For certain formulas, ltl(i, ϕ) is obtained from ϕ by a very simple rewriting
(see Table 1).
Remark 2. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula that
– only uses negation, conjunction, disjunction, next, eventually, and always, and
– has no always in the scope of a negation.
Then,
– ltl(1, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by ,
– ltl(2, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by ,
– ltl(3, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by , and
– ltl(4, ϕ) is equivalent to the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every by , every by , and
every by .
The Main Lemma We begin by proving a technical lemma about restrictions on the truth values that
formulas can assume on simple words. These are later used to prove that certain truth values are not realizable
in rLTL.
Lemma 5. Let ϕ be an rLTL formula.
1. Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[2] = Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3] for all u ∈ Σ∗.
2. Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[3] = Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[4] for all non-empty u ∈ Σ∗.
3. If ϕ does not contain the release operator, then Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[1] = Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[2] for all non-empty u ∈ Σ∗.
Proof. The proofs of all three items proceed by induction over the construction of ϕ. The induction start
and the induction steps for Boolean connectives can be abstracted into the following closure property, which
follows easily from the alternative definition of Vr :
Let T ⊆ B4 contain 0000 and 1111. If Vr(σ, ϕ1) and Vr(σ, ϕ2) are in T , then so are Vr(σ, p) for atomic
propositions p, Vr(σ,¬ϕ1), Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), Vr(σ, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), and Vr(σ, ϕ1 → ϕ2).
1.) The induction start and the induction step for the Boolean operators follow from the closure property,
where we pick T to be the set of truth values from B4 whose second and third bit coincide. Furthermore,
due to Remark 1, we only have to consider the inductive steps for the next, until, and release operator. All
three cases rely on the following simple fact: A suffix u∅ω[n,∞) for some n is again of the form u′∅ω, i.e.,
the induction hypothesis is applicable to suffixes. Also, if n ≥ |u|, then u∅ω[n,∞) = ∅ω. In particular, u∅ω
has only finitely many distinct suffixes.
So, first consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗,
Vr(u∅
ω, ϕ)[2] =Vr(u∅
ω[1,∞), ϕ1)[2]
=Vr(u∅
ω[1,∞), ϕ1)[3] = Vr(u∅
ω, ϕ)[3],
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where the second equality is due to the induction hypothesis being applied to the suffix u∅ω[1,∞).
Next, consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1 Uϕ2. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗,
Vr(u∅
ω, ϕ)[2]
=max
n≥0
min{Vr(u∅
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[2], min
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[2]}
=max
n≥0
min{Vr(u∅
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], min
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=Vr(u∅
ω, ϕ)[3],
where the second equality follows from an application of the induction hypothesis to the suffixes u∅ω[n,∞)
and u∅ω[n′,∞).
It remains to consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1 Rϕ2. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗, that
Vr(u∅
ω, ϕ)[2] is by definition equal to
max
m≥0
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[2], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[2]}
=max
m≥0
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
= max
m≥|u|
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
= max
m≥|u|
min
n≥m
max{Vr(∅
ω, ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′≤|u|
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=max{Vr(∅
ω, ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′≤|u|
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]},
The first equality follows from twice applying the induction hypothesis. For the second one, observe that
min
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
is increasing in m. For the third one, note that for all n ≥ |u|, u∅ω[n,∞) = ∅ω, which means that we
have eliminated every occurrence of m and n. This explains the last equality. Similarly, Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3] is by
definition equal to
min
m≥0
max
n≥m
max{Vr(u∅
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=max{Vr(∅
ω, ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′≤|u|
Vr(u∅
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]},
where the equality again follows from all suffixes u∅ω[n,∞) with n ≥ |u| being equal to ∅ω. Thus, we have
derived the desired equality between Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[2] and Vr(u∅ω, ϕ)[3].
2.) The induction start and the induction steps for Boolean operators follow from the closure property,
where we here pick T to be the set of truth values from B4 whose third and fourth bit coincide. For u =
u(0) · · ·u(|u| − 1) and n < |u|, we define ρ(u, n) = u(n) · · ·u(|u| − 1)u(0) · · ·u(n− 1), i.e., ρ(u, n) is obtained
by “rotating” u n times. The induction steps for the temporal operators are based on the following simple
fact: The suffix uω[n,∞) is equal to (ρ(u, n mod |u|))ω, i.e., the induction hypothesis is applicable to the
suffixes. In particular, uω has only finitely many distinct suffixes, which all appear infinitely often in a cyclic
order.
Now, the induction steps for the next and until operator are analogous to their counterparts in Item 1,
as the only property we require there is that the induction hypothesis is applicable to suffixes. Hence, due
to Remark 1, it only remains to consider the inductive step for the release operator.
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So consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1 Rϕ2. Then, we have, for an arbitrary u ∈ Σ∗, that Vr(uω, ϕ)[3]
is by definition equal to
min
m≥0
max
n≥m
max{Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[3], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[3]}
=min
m≥0
max
n≥m
max{Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[4]}
= max
0≤n<|u|
max{Vr((ρ(u, n))
ω, ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr((ρ(u, n
′))ω, ϕ1)[4]},
where the first equality follows from twice applying the induction hypothesis and the second one is due to
all suffixes uω[n,∞) being equal to ρ(u, n mod |u|)ω, and that there are only finitely many, which all appear
infinitely often in a cyclic order among the (ρ(u, n))ω for 0 ≤ n < |u|.
Similarly, Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[4] is by definition equal to
max
n≥0
max{Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr(u
ω[n′,∞), ϕ1)[4]}
= max
0≤n<|u|
max{Vr((ρ(u, n))
ω, ϕ2)[4], max
0≤n′<n
Vr((ρ(u, n
′))ω, ϕ1)[4]},
where the equality again follows from all suffixes uω[n,∞) being equal to ρ(u, n mod |u|)ω, and that there
are only finitely many, which appear in a cyclic order: In particular, after the first |u| suffixes, we have seen
all of them. Thus, we have derived the desired equality between Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[3] and Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[4].
3.) The induction start and the induction steps for Boolean operators are covered by the closure property,
where we here pick T to be the set of truth values from B4 whose first and second bit coincide. The cases of
the next and until operator are again analogous to the first and second item. Hence, we only have to consider
the inductive step for the always operator, as we here only consider formulas without release.
So, consider a formula of the form ϕ = ϕ1. Here, we again rely on the fact that the suffix u
ω[n,∞) is
equal to (ρ(u, n mod |u|))ω. By definition, Vr(uω, ϕ)[1] is equal to
min
n≥0
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[1] =min
n≥0
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[2]
= min
0≤n<|u|
Vr((ρ(u, n))
ω , ϕ1)[2],
where the first equality is due to the induction hypothesis and the second one due to the fact that uω has
only finitely many suffixes, which are all already realized by some uω[n,∞) for 0 ≤ n < |u|.
Similarly, Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[2] is by definition equal to
max
m≥0
min
n≥m
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[1] =max
m≥0
min
n≥m
Vr(u
ω[n,∞), ϕ1)[2]
= min
0≤n<|u|
Vr((ρ(u, n))
ω , ϕ1)[2],
where the two equalities follow as before: the first by induction hypothesis and the second one by the fact
that uω has only finitely many suffixes, which all appear infinitely often in a cyclic order and which are
all already realized by some uω[n,∞) for 0 ≤ n < |u|. Thus, we have derived the desired equality between
Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[1] and Vr(u
ω, ϕ)[2]. ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall that we need to prove that V mr is well-defined, i.e., that V
m
r (u, ϕ) ∈ B
?
4 for every
rLTL formula ϕ and every u ∈ Σ∗.
Proof. Let V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = 0 and j < i. By definition of V
m
r , we have Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = 0 for every σ ∈ Σ
ω. Hence,
due to the monotonicity of the truth values from B4 used to define Vr , we obtain Vr(uσ, ϕ)[j] = 0 for every
such σ. Hence, V mr (u, ϕ)[j] = 0.
A dual argument shows that V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = 1 and j > i implies V
m
r (u, ϕ)[j] = 1. Combining both
properties yields V mr (u, ϕ) ∈ 0
∗?∗1∗, i.e., V mr (u, ϕ) ∈ B
?
4. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Theorem 1 Recall that we need to prove that all truth values but 0011 and 0001 are realizable.
Proof. We begin by showing that 0011 and 0001 are not realizable.
First, towards a contradiction, assume there is an rLTL formula ϕ and a prefix u such that V mr (u, ϕ) =
0011, i.e., for every extension uσ, we have Vr(uσ)[2] = 0 and Vr(uσ)[3] = 1. However, by picking σ = ∅ω we
obtain the desired contradiction to Lemma 5.1.
The proof for 0001 is similar. Assume there is an rLTL formula ϕ and a prefix u such that V mr (u, ϕ) = 0001.
Due to Lemma 2, we can assume that u is non-empty. Thus, we have Vr(u
ω, ϕ) = 0001 by definition of Vmr ,
which contradicts Lemma 5.2.
Finally, applying Lemma 5.3, one can show that no rLTL formula without the release operator real-
izes 0111. However, we show below that it is realizable by a formula with the release operator.
Next, we show that every other truth value β /∈ {0011, 0001} is indeed realizable. The witnessing pairs
of prefixes and formulas are presented in Table 2.
First, consider β = 0111 with prefix u = ∅{a} and formula ϕ = aR a. We have ltl(1, ϕ) = aR a and
ltl(2, ϕ) = a ∨ a. Note that aRa is violated by uσ, for every σ ∈ Σω. Dually, a ∨ a is satisfied
by uσ, for every σ ∈ Σω. Hence, for arbitrary σ ∈ Σω, we have Vr(uσ, ϕ)[1] = 0 and Vr(uσ, ϕ)[2] = 1. Hence,
we have Vr(uσ, ϕ) = 0111 for every σ, as this is the only truth value that matches this pattern. Hence, by
definition, we obtain Vmr (u, ϕ) = 0111.
The verification for all other truth values is based on Remark 2, which is applicable to all formulas ϕ in
the third column witnessing the realization of a truth value β 6= 0111. Now, for every such truth value β and
corresponding pair (u, ϕ), one can easily verify the following:
– If β[i] = 0, then no uσ satisfies ltl(i, ϕ).
– If β[i] = 1, then every uσ satisfies ltl(i, ϕ).
– If β[i] =?, then there are σ, σ′ such that uσ satisfies ltl(i, ϕ) and such that uσ′ violates ltl(i, ϕ). In all
such cases, σ, σ′ ∈ {∅ω, {a}ω, {a}∅ω, ∅{a}ω, ({a}∅)ω} suffice.
We leave the details of this slightly tedious, but trivial, verification to the reader. ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 2 Recall that we need to prove that u ⊑ u′ implies V mr (u, ϕ)  V
m
r (u
′, ϕ).
Proof. Let u ⊑ u′ and assume we have V mr (u, ϕ)[i] ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, by definition, Vr(uσ, ϕ)[i] = V
m
r (u, ϕ)[i]
for every σ ∈ Σω. Now, as u is a prefix of u′, we can decompose u′ into u′ = uv for some v ∈ Σ∗ and every
extension u′σ′ of u′ is the extension uvσ′ of u. Hence, we have Vr(u
′σ′, ϕ)[i] = Vr(uvσ
′, ϕ)[i] = Vmr (u, ϕ)[i]
for every σ′ ∈ Σω. Thus, V mr (u
′, ϕ)[i] = V mr (u, ϕ)[i].
As this property holds for every i, we obtain V mr (u, ϕ)  V
m
r (u
′, ϕ). ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 3 Here, we need to construct a formula ϕ and prefixes u0 ⊏ u1 ⊏ u2 ⊏ u3 ⊏ u4 such
that V mr (u0, ϕ) ≺ V
m
r (u1, ϕ) ≺ V
m
r (u2, ϕ) ≺ V
m
r (u3, ϕ) ≺ V
m
r (u4, ϕ).
Proof. Consider the sequence β0, . . . , β4 with βj = 0
j?4−j and note that we have βj ≺ βj+1 for every j < 4.
Furthermore, let uj = ∅
j for j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}. We construct a formula ϕ such that V mr (uj , ϕ) = βj for every
j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}.
To this end, let
– ψβ1 = (a ∧ ¬ a),
– ψβ2 = (a ∧ ¬a) ∧ ¬ ¬ a, and
– ψβ3 = a ∧ ¬ a.
Later, we rely on the following fact about these formulas, which can easily be shown by applying Remark 2:
we have V mr (u, ψβj) = βj for every prefix u.
Further, for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, let ψj be a formula that requires the proposition a to be violated at the
first j − 1 positions, but to hold at the j-th position (recall that we start counting at zero), i.e., ψj =
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∧
0≤j′<j
j′ ¬a ∧ j a. Here, we define the nesting of next operators as usual: 0 ξ = ξ and j+1 ξ = j ξ.
By definition, we have Vr(∅j+1σ, ψj) = 0000 for every σ ∈ Σω (†).
Now, we define
ϕ = ψ0 ∨
3∨
j=1
(
ψβj ∧ ψj
)
and claim that it has the desired properties. To this end, we note that property (†) implies Vr(∅4σ, ϕ) = 0000
for every σ ∈ Σω (††), as every disjunct of ϕ contains a conjunct of the form ψj for some j ≤ 3. Also, let us
mention that Remark 2 is applicable to ϕ.
It remains to prove Vmr (uj, ϕ) = βj for every j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}.
– For j = 0, we have u0 = ε and β0 = ????. Hence, it suffices to present σ0, σ1 ∈ Σω such that Vr(σ0, ϕ) =
0000 and Vr(σ1, ϕ) = 1111.
Due to property (††), we can pick σ0 = ∅ω. To conclude, we pick σ1 = {a}ω, as we have
Vr(σ1, ϕ) ≥ Vr(σ1, ψ0) = Vr({a}
ω, a) = 1111,
where the first inequality follows from ψ0 being a disjunct of ϕ.
– For j = 1, we have u1 = ∅ and β1 = 0???. To show V mr (u1, ϕ) = β1, it suffices to present σ0, σ1 ∈ Σ
ω
such that Vr(u1σ0, ϕ) = 0000, Vr(u1σ1, ϕ) = 0111, and show that Vr(u1σ, ϕ)[1] = 0 for every σ ∈ Σω.
For the former task, we again pick σ0 = ∅ω due to property (††). For the latter task, using Remark 2,
one can easily verify that ltl(1, ϕ) is not satisfied by u1σ for any σ ∈ Σω, which implies the result.
To conclude, consider
Vr(u1{a}
ω, ψβj ∧ ψj)
=min{Vr(u1{a}
ω, ψβj), Vr(u1{a}
ω, ψj)}
=min{0111, 1111}= 0111,
where Vr(u1{a}ω, ψβj ) = 0111 can easily be verified using Remark 2.
– The reasoning for j = 2, 3 is along the same lines as the one for j = 1 and is left to the reader.
– For j = 4, we have u4 = ∅∅∅∅ and β4 = 0000. Hence, our claim follows directly from property (††), which
shows Vr(u4σ, ϕ) = 0000 for every σ ∈ Σω. ⊓⊔
A.2 Proofs Omitted from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 4 Recall that we need to show that u ∈ L(Bϕβ ) if and only if there exists an infinite
word σ ∈ Σω with Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β.
Proof. We show both directions of Lemma 4 separately.
From left to right: Assume u ∈ L(Bϕβ ). Moreover, let q ∈ F
⋆
β be the final state reached by B
ϕ
β on an accepting
run on u (which exists since u ∈ L(Bϕβ )). By definition of F
⋆
β , this means that L(A
ϕ
β (q)) 6= ∅, say
σ ∈ L(Aϕβ (q)). Since A
ϕ
β and B
ϕ
β share the same transition structures, the run of B
ϕ
β on u is also a run
of Aϕβ on u, which both lead to state q. Therefore, uσ ∈ L(A
ϕ
β ). By Theorem 2, this is equivalent to
Vr(uσ, ϕ) = β.
From right to left: Let u ∈ Σ∗ and σ ∈ Σω such that V (uσ, ϕ) = β. By Theorem 2, we have uσ ∈ L(Aϕβ ).
Consider an accepting run of Aϕβ on uσ, and let q be the state that A
ϕ
β reaches after reading the finite
prefix u. Since uσ ∈ L(Aϕβ ), this means that σ ∈ L(A
ϕ
β (q)). Thus, q ∈ F
⋆
β because L(A
ϕ
β (q)) 6= ∅.
Moreover, since the run of Aϕβ on u is also a run of B
ϕ
β on u, the NFA B
ϕ
β can also reach state q after
reading u. Therefore, u ∈ L(Bϕβ ) since q ∈ F
⋆
β . ⊓⊔
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Proof of Theorem 3 Here, we need to show that Mϕ is an rLTL monitor for ϕ, i.e., that λMϕ(u) =
V mr (u, ϕ).
Proof. First, we observe that ξ indeed produces a valid value of B?4 (i.e., a truth value of the form 0
∗?∗1∗).
This follows immediately from the definition of ξ and the fact that the truth values of rLTL are in 0∗1∗.
Next, we observe that Mϕ reaches state (q1, q2, q3, q4, q5) after reading a word u ∈ Σ∗ if and only if for
each βj ∈ B4 the DFA C
ϕ
βj
reaches state qj after reading u. A simple induction over the length of inputs fed
to Mϕ proves this.
Now, let us fix a word u ∈ Σ∗ and assume that (q1, q2, q3, q4, q5) is the state reached byMϕ after reading
u. This means that each individual DFA Cϕβj = (Q
′
βj
, q′I,βj , δ
′
βj
, F ′βj ) reaches state qj after reading u. Let now
B =
{
βj ∈ B4 | qj ∈ F
′
βj
, j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
}
as in the definition of the output function λ of Mϕ. By applying Lemma 4, we then obtain
βj ∈ B ⇔ qj ∈ F
′
βj
⇔ u ∈ L(Cϕβj )⇔ u ∈ L(B
ϕ
βj
)⇔ ∃σ ∈ Σω : Vr(uσ, ϕ) = βj .
To conclude the proof, it is left to show that ξ(B) = Vmr (u, ϕ). We show this for each bit individually
using a case distinction over the elements of B? = {0, ?, 1}. So as to clutter this proof not too much, however,
we here only discuss the case of ?, while noting that the remaining two cases can be proven analogously.
Thus, let i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Then,
ξ(B)[i] = ?⇔ ∃β, β′ ∈ B : β[i] = 0 and β′[i] = 1
⇔ ∃σ0, σ1 ∈ Σ
ω : Vr(uσ0, ϕ)[i] = 0 and Vr(uσ1, ϕ)[i] = 1
⇔ V mr (u, ϕ)[i] = ?.
Since λ
(
(q1, q2, q3, q4, q5)
)
= ξ(B), the Moore machine Mϕ indeed outputs V mr (u, ϕ) for every word
u ∈ Σ∗, which proves Theorem 3. ⊓⊔
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